Communication as Battlefield: US Think Tank Wargames Cyber-Economic Pressure on Taiwan

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies warned on 6 October 2026 that sporadic hacking and military drills could become sustained gray-zone pressure on Taiwan's communications networks. A late-September wargame in Taiwan, briefed to Lai Ching-te and his national security team, simulated a two-phase campaign short of invasion.

FDD warning

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) warned on 6 October 2026 that a foreign actor is more likely to pursue cyber-economic warfare than a direct military takeover of Taiwan. The think tank said hacking incidents and military drills that now occur mostly in isolation could be turned into a continuous gray-zone pressure campaign. One described method is to place systematic stress on Taiwan's communications infrastructure beyond what backup systems can absorb.

FDD held a wargame in Taiwan in late September 2026 on how communications networks could be disrupted without an invasion, with the political aim of forcing concessions. Results were reported to Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te and his national security team.

Phase one and phase two

The exercise ran in two stages. Phase one used covert, low-intensity probes: sporadic mobile-signal interruptions, disinformation, light interference with satellite links, and more frequent activity near undersea cables so those movements were harder to detect. Simulated effects also included local cellular outages and tampering with information.

Craig Singleton, director of FDD's China program, said the opening design was to make daily life less reliable and to weaken public trust in the authorities while avoiding a direct clash with the United States. Communications failures could also disrupt payments, delay emergency coordination, and make power outages harder to handle.

Taiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs coordinated the response. Telecom operators moved traffic onto other routes and used backup systems plus domestic roaming agreements.

Phase two raised the pressure. Simulated actions included intrusion into government websites, disabling substations that supply power to telecom facilities, cutting several international undersea cables so remaining cables ran at the limit of capacity, and placing heavy load on microwave and satellite backup networks.

Typhoon campaigns and recovery time

The scenario drew on Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon activity, including cyber operations against telecom networks and the use of access to critical infrastructure for destructive attacks during a major crisis or conflict. Singleton said that once an adversary understands a network, its dependencies, and its backup paths, disruption becomes more targeted and adaptive.

He said the sterner test is whether those backups can keep service running for weeks after an adversary has studied the response and aimed at the fallback systems. Satellite links are a main backup and were tested in the game. Singleton said satellites provide redundancy, not absolute security. Ground equipment and software can be targeted, and the service depends on the electric grid and commercial companies.

Mark Montgomery, an FDD senior fellow and retired US Navy rear admiral who helped lead the exercise, said policymakers often underestimate how long recovery takes after systems fail, especially when restoring one service depends on others returning first. He said that pattern has appeared in exercises in several countries. Stated recovery times are often counted in minutes or hours, he said, while his experience is days or weeks.

US planning gaps and 2028 warning

Exercise organizers warned that the United States has given too little attention to preparing for cyber attacks and economic pressure against Taiwan, and that a split between military and civilian planning could delay aid. Montgomery said Washington regularly rehearses a possible military conflict over Taiwan but is less systematic about preparing for cyber operations that are more likely.

He said the Department of Defense treats the problem as belonging to other federal agencies, and those agencies lack the budget or systematic process to run such tabletops. FDD said it hopes to hold joint exercises with congressional staff and federal agencies.

Singleton said staged failures were designed to tell Taiwan's authorities that technical workarounds cannot continue indefinitely, that communications effects can spread into the power grid and daily economic activity, and that pressure can also be reduced. That ability to adjust, he said, sends a political signal that a path back to normal exists if Taiwan changes its behavior.

He said Taiwan's ability to withstand such coercion depends on how much resilience it builds in communications and on how firmly Japan and the United States respond, including with undersea-cable repair ships, cyber teams, insurance guarantees, and satellite capacity.

Montgomery also warned that if Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party wins a fourth consecutive leadership election, cyber and economic coercion could intensify in early 2028.